COUNTERING CORRUPTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL AID DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM
Abstract
This article examines the factors contributing to the emergence of corruption in the international aid distribution system and assesses the effectiveness of existing anti-corruption measures and the feasibility of their application to prevent possible abuses in the distribution of international aid. It is shown that the key features of the international aid distribution system that make it more vulnerable to the spread of corrupt practices and significantly limit the range of possible anti-corruption measures are, firstly, the impossibility of simplifying most of the bureaucratic procedures provided by the relevant formal rules of the international aid distribution system, and, secondly, the impossibility of radically reducing the discretionary powers granted to officials responsible for the final decision-making on the distribution of international aid. It is revealed that the above-mentioned features of the international aid distribution system are the direct cause of the following negative consequences: the danger of spreading corruption in the humanitarian aid distribution system; a significant reduction in the effectiveness of international aid programs due to the distribution of funds that does not meet the main goals of the program; loss of effectiveness of checks on the activities of an official due to the absence of formal signs of his/her clear abuse of authority. Based on the analysis of the motives of the parties of a corruption agreement, it is proven that in order to prevent corruption in the system of international aid distribution, it is inappropriate to use such common anti-corruption measures as reducing the level of transaction costs of clients and applying repressive anti-corruption measures. To prevent corruption in the system of international aid distribution, a set of the following anti-corruption measures is proposed: depriving the official of the opportunity to make decisions alone, depriving the official of the monopoly on decision-making and preventing the formation of informal relations between the client and the official. The main advantage of the proposed measures is their high efficiency combined with the absence of undesirable negative impact on the efficiency of the system of international aid distribution.
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